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Get What You Want, Give What You Can: Embedded Public Finance in
Porto Alegre
Aaron Schneider and Marcelo Baquero
Abstract
The problem of public finance in Latin America is a structural contradiction. The historical
pattern of insertion in the international economy creates a large number of poor who have
very real material needs for public services, but they cannot individually or collectively 
contribute the funds to pay for them. Rich people hold wealth, but they are unwilling to
contribute to public services that go to other groups while they turn to private schools,
education and transportation. They are especially unwilling to hand over their wealth to
governments perceived as corrupt, inefficient, and illegitimate. This raises a basic puzzle:
how do governments provide for those in need while securing the compliance of those
with wealth? 
In this context, the innovation of participatory budgeting is a striking example of embedded
public finance in which taxes and expenditures are rooted in government legitimacy. Three
elements comprise embedded public finance:
l Democratic participation in which an increasing number of citizens participate in public
decisions, and different groups, especially the poor, have been incorporated;
l Progressive public spending in which investment in poor neighbourhoods has increased
both in absolute terms and in relation to rich neighbourhoods;
l Competent governance in which perceptions of corruption have decreased, and 
administrative structures riddled with clientelism and patronage have been reformed. 
These three elements rest atop a political coalition that joins middle sector and poor voters.
Because these citizen groups have different needs, the state had to tailor the benefits it
extended to the demands of each group. This strategy allowed the state to mobilise distinct
contributions from each group, votes from the poor and tax compliance from those with
wealth.
Keywords: public finance, participatory budgeting, tax, Port Alegre, investment, public
expenditure.
Aaron Schneider is a Fellow at the Institute for Development Studies
(a.schneider@ids.ac.uk). Marcelo Baquero is Professor of Political Science at the Federal
University of Rio Grande do Sul (baquero@orion.ufrgs.br). This paper was written for the
DRC Centre for the Future State Project who provided funding for this work. Further
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1 Introduction
In January 2003, a citizen reported to a municipal official to pay his property taxes. In most
cases, this would not be all that remarkable, but this was different. This was a man living on
unregistered land on an island in the river next to the city of Porto Alegre, Brazil; he was a
poor migrant from another region without legal ownership; the city had no realistic record
of acreage on the island or his presence there; he was under no real obligation to property
tax. Yet, he voluntarily came forward. Even more surprising, he was not alone; there were
several hundred similar cases. Why would a person voluntarily pay a tax they did not 
necessarily have to pay? When asked, he explained, ‘We want to pay our taxes. It’s the right
thing to do. It would give us more security, more peace of mind. If we are not paying, after
all, we can’t make the claim for user-rights ... The participatory budget has operated here
for many years, and I even go to the meetings, but I didn’t feel I could make demands. Until
now. It wasn’t because I didn’t have needs, but until now, I hadn’t paid any taxes.’
This example speaks eloquently of a unique innovation in public finance. That innovation,
participatory budgeting, has changed the way citizens view the state, altered the 
organisation and performance of the public sector, and allowed the state to mobilise 
previously untapped revenues. This new fiscal regime, with participatory budgeting at its
heart, responds to a fiscal straightjacket that constrains developing countries, and Brazil in
particular. They operate in an environment of resource scarcity made worse by the 
inadequacy, inefficiency, and inequity of revenues, rooted in the illegitimacy of state 
administrations. Nicholas Kaldor long ago asked, ‘Will underdeveloped countries learn to
tax?’ (1963), and among developing regions, Latin American countries have learned to tax
less and more regressively than any others (Lledo, Schneider, and Moore 2002; Bird,
Martinez-Velazquez and Torgler 2004; Tanzi and Zee 2000). Yet, tax in Latin America is not
a problem because of a lack of resources; these are mostly middle income countries with
pockets of extreme wealth waiting to be mobilised (IADB 1998; Schneider, Acharya and
Ugaz 2005). 
The problem of public finance in Latin America is structural; the historical pattern of
insertion in the international economy has concentrated domestic wealth and created a
host of social and political problems. Poor people have very real material needs and they
depend on public services for survival, but they cannot individually or collectively contribute
the funds to pay for them. Rich people hold wealth, but they are unwilling to contribute to
public services that go to other groups while they turn to private schools, education, and
transportation. They are especially unwilling to hand over their wealth to governments 
perceived as corrupt, inefficient, and illegitimate. This raises a basic puzzle: how do 
governments provide for those in need while securing the compliance of those with
wealth? 
In this context, the performance of Brazil’s government in raising taxes has been particularly
remarkable. The country mobilises 37 per cent of GDP in tax revenues, a quantity that
places it among OECD countries despite a far lower per capita income and a distribution of
wealth among the most unequal in the world. In Porto Alegre, tax capacity has also
expanded significantly, but it has expanded in a distinctive fashion. The rest of the country
has raised taxes while leaving serious distortions, inefficiencies, and imperfections, largely as
a result of concentrating on indirect and cumulative taxes that increase the tax take but
exacerbate the dead-weight losses for the economy (Varsano 1998: 2003). Tax effort in
Porto Alegre is different. It provides a unique opportunity to study the way revenue, 
spending, and legitimate government go together. 
At the root of expanded tax capacity is a new regime of embedded public finance 
composed of three elements:
l Democratic participation in which an increasing number of citizens participate in public
decisions, and different groups, especially the poor, have been incorporated;
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l Progressive public spending; investment in poor neighbourhoods has increased both in 
absolute terms and in relation to rich neighbourhoods;
l Competent governance; perceptions of corruption have decreased, and administrative 
structures riddled with clientelism and patronage have been reformed. As a result, 
embedded public finance mobilises resources for development; tax revenue has risen, 
over and above transfers from central government.
We connect these elements by tracing the niche marketing strategy associated with 
participatory budgeting. It embedded public finance in a cross-class coalition of poor and
middle class voters in which categories of voters perceived their relationship with the state
in different ways. This is only natural; middle class voters and lower class voters care about
different things. Yet, the need for a government to tailor its appeals is overlooked in most
analyses of public finance and governance more generally.
In the following section, we draw from literature on state-society linkages to derive a
model of embedded public finance. We then proceed to examine the institutional 
innovations that were designed to create closer links between state actors and social
groups, and explore some puzzling patterns of participation that suggest differences in the
ways groups connected to the state. We then trace the revenue and expenditure 
implications of embedded public finance in Porto Alegre, with particular attention to the
kinds of revenues mobilised and the distribution of expenditures that followed. Finally, we
report the results of a public opinion survey that traces the way in which citizens perceived
their relationship with the state. In effect, the state offered the tailored benefits social
groups demand while seeking the contributions each group could offer. 
2 Embedded public finance
To understand the nature of the state-society relationship constructed around participatory
budgeting, Peter Evans’s provocative concept of embedded autonomy is useful. Evans
described the nature of state society linkages in developmental regimes as a combination of
autonomy and embeddedness. His concept charted an intermediate path between 
(1) Marxist and pluralist views that reduced the state to a response to social forces and 
(2) elitist views that looked only at the nature of state institutions and political elites. Evans
focused on the way actors within the state embedded themselves in relevant social groups
(Evans 1995). ‘The power of embedded autonomy arises from the fusion of what seem at
first to be contradictory characteristics. Embeddedness provides sources of intelligence and
channels of implementation that enhance the competence of the state. Autonomy 
complements embeddedness, protecting the state from piecemeal capture, which would
destroy the cohesiveness of the state itself and eventually undermine the coherence of its
social interlocutors’ (Evans 1995). 
The combination of embeddedness and autonomy allows a virtuous circle of responsive and
capable authority. First, state actors are close enough to society to perceive the demands of
different groups. Second, state actors have the autonomy to manipulate their policies to
selectively respond to societal demands in ways that build a support base patching together
potentially disparate and competing groups. As a result, the state can call upon the contri-
bution of these groups, mobilising resources, legitimacy, and political support necessary to
promote development. The balance between embeddedness and autonomy is difficult. Too
much autonomy and states become exclusionary, illegitimate, and potentially authoritarian.
Too much embeddedness and the state becomes a captured instrument of narrow interests.
In the context of public finance, embedded autonomy refers to a system that gathers and
distributes resources through close links between state actors and their societal 
counterparts. Participatory budgeting institutions assist in this task by penetrating society
but remaining open enough to be sensitive to societal demands. As a result, the state can
call on the political and material support of citizens. 
09 
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The interesting aspect of participatory budgeting for the current project is the innovative
exchange dictated by the social composition of embeddedness. In Porto Alegre, the sectors
targeted include lower class and middle sectors, which have different demands and different
potential contributions. The nature of the state-society relationship therefore has to be 
customised. Middle sectors exchange their tax contributions for democratic and participatory
governance; poor voters offer their political support for redistributive spending. To examine
these patterns, the following sections will explore the evolution of participatory budgeting
over the last 16 years, patterns of public finance and participation, and the results of a 
survey of citizen perceptions in 2003. In particular, the study shows how an effective, 
progressive, embedded public finance operates.
Before proceeding, it is useful to emphasise that the current analysis stands apart from 
previous studies of participatory budgeting in a number of ways. First, this study is 
state-centric. It considers how state actors designed institutions to achieve fiscal capacity
and political support during the 1990s. The attempt to ‘See Like a State’ (Scott 1998) stands
in contrast to most studies of participatory budgeting which focus primarily on society.
Society-focused approaches emphasise the widespread and diffuse normative results of a
more deliberative democracy (Fung and Wright 2003; 2001). Studies of this type usefully
examine the social conditions necessary to introduce participatory budgeting (Baierle 1998a,
1999; Cabannes 2004; Goldfrank 2005; Wampler 2004; Avritzer and Navarro 2003), the
impact of deliberation on popular consciousness (Avritzer 1999; Baierle 1998b; Abers 1998,
2000); and the social capital generated by an empowered and active civil society (Baiocchi
2003: 58; Navarro 1998a). 
Curiously, diffuse social capital and heightened citizen consciousness did not translate directly
into greater state legitimacy and ability to mobilise resources (Baquero et al. 2005).
Brazilians, like most people, do not like paying tax, and no amount of public feeling makes
them want to hand over their paycheck. In Brazil in general, tax morale is relatively low and
democracy is only moderately supported (Torgler 2004). 
On the other hand, it is clear that in Porto Alegre state capacity strengthened, government
paid far more attention to the poor, and institutions opened to popular participation. In
some ways, the fact this shift did not depend on a massive groundswell of fellow-feeling is
propitious; we do not have to change human nature to achieve embedded public finance.
What made embedded public finance possible was targeted links to specific social groups.
This paper looks at how these links operated.
In all the literature on the topic, nobody has framed participatory budgeting in quite this
way. Part of the reason may be the intellectual biases of international observers and
Brazilian progressives. Internationally, many of those most interested in participatory 
budgeting see it as a fulfillment of citizen rights to participation and public services. To talk
of links to specific groups implies an unpalatable particularism and exclusivity in which some
benefit and others do not. In Brazil, targeting has an even worse association; Brazilian 
progressives see targeting as a code for neoliberal social programs that cut overall spending
to sustain fiscal discipline while leaving a few crumbs to the very poorest. Brazilian 
progressives much prefer to use the language of universalism, in which entitlements are
guaranteed to all, and no distinctions are made among citizens (Draibe 2004). 
Participatory budgeting was neither particularistic nor neoliberal, but the fear of these 
concepts blinded observers to certain features of the system. The revenue side of
participatory budgeting remains remarkably misunderstood. Most observers note that 
participatory budgeting emerged just when the central government increased transfers and
the municipal government raised taxes. They treat the availability of additional resources as
something exogenous, outside, and apart from the real action taking place on expenditures.
This separation between revenues and spending is a symptom of public finance more 
generally in which inflows and outflows are treated as separate entities to be managed by
different administrations and understood with different concepts. The case of participatory
budgeting demonstrates that the two sides of the fiscal ledger are intimately linked.
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3 Participatory budgeting 
institutions
Following their electoral capture of the mayor’s office in Porto Alegre in 1988, Workers’
Party activists structured participatory institutions that consistently attracted thousands of
people to meetings to discuss the budget. These meetings offered government access to
citizens both directly and indirectly, through the publicity gained as a result of opening 
public decisions to participation. As a result, the government was able to greatly increase its
tax receipts, restructure public action towards investment, and target investments towards
poor neighbourhoods and social sectors. The institution and the patterns of public finance
are now so well entrenched that they survived the exit of the Workers’ Party from power
in 2004. The new administration has continued with participatory budgeting, impressive 
fiscal revenues, and honored the spending priorities chosen in participatory meetings.
The Workers’ Party administration initially faced a bankrupt municipal government, an
opposition majority in the city legislature and a hostile public among neighbourhood 
associations linked to the party of the outgoing administration. To meet these challenges
and mobilise support, the administration established an open system of neighbourhood
meetings that would make decisions on the budget (Fedozzi 2000: 132–46). The meetings
allowed ‘unorganised’ community movements to participate, skirting hostile neighbourhood
associations (Baiocchi 2004; Goldfrank 2003) as well as creating a direct link between the
executive and the populace that would avoid mediation through the municipal assembly
(Goldfrank and Schneider, forthcoming). 
Participatory meetings were held in each neighbourhood. These produced delegates to 16
regional meetings for the city. As an incentive to increase neighbourhood participation, the
number of regional delegates was a weighted proportion of the number of people that
showed up to neighbourhood meetings (Avritzer 2002b). Regional meetings then occurred
periodically during the budget cycle and involved information sharing, deliberation on 
priorities and projects, oversight of projects being implemented, and selection of delegates
to a city-wide budget council. In this council, two councilors from each region entered 
discussions with municipal representatives to select priorities for investments and allocate
spending across regions. 
The priorities of the regions entered a formula that determined the level of investments to
different sectors and across regions. The formula took into account factors such as the 
infrastructure needs of different neighbourhoods, levels of poverty, and the population of
the neighbourhoods. The resulting allocation was discussed in the council and, once
approved, integrated directly in the municipal budget sent to the legislature (dos Santos
1998). During the subsequent year, regional meetings and the council of delegates would
oversee implementation, and towards the end of each year, could decide on modifications
to the process, such as changes to the investment formula, designation of regions, and
structure of participation.
One modification to the structure occurred under the second Workers’ Party administration
that began in 1993. The administration introduced thematic meetings alongside the regional
ones. Like the regional meetings, thematic meetings opened participation widely, selected
priorities, elected councilors to the municipal council, and oversaw implementation, but the
thematic meetings differed in their focus on city-wide issues. The five thematic regional
meetings in 2002 were city organisation and urban development; health and social 
assistance; economic development and tax systems; transport and circulation; and education,
culture, and leisure. The establishment of the thematic meetings was intended to help 
promote more city-wide investments (Abers 2000: 84–5); to give greater attention to 
middle-class professionals whose personal material needs were met, but who had 
professional interests in contributing to municipal planning and policy (‘E Hora da Classe
Media disputar espaço no OP’, Zero Hora 22 December 1992; Navarro 1996: 27; Baiocchi
11 
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2004: 49–51); and to better include the established corporatist organisations such as unions
and business associations (Fedozzi 2001: 133–4).
Figure 3.1 below describes the participatory budget cycle as it operates throughout the 
fiscal year.
Figure 3.1 Participatory budget cycle
The installation of participatory budgeting implied a rearrangement of municipal institutions.
Bureaucratic hierarchies and ministerial tasks had to be adjusted to link them vertically to
regions of the city and groups within society. Much of the administrative apparatus that
would articulate these links was subordinated directly to the authority of the Mayor’s office
or indirectly to the Mayor through Secretaries. At the heart of the process was the Cabinet
of Planning (GAPLAN), with primary responsibility for strategic planning, managing the
investment plan, and coordinating the annual budget proposal. Some of these tasks had
previously been located in the Secretary of Planning, but they were consolidated under the
authority of the Mayor beginning in 1990. 
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The other major bureaucratic instrument within the participatory budget was the
Community Relations Coordination (CRC), which was also moved under the direct authority
of the Mayor’s office. The CRC officers were responsible for representing the government
in each of the participatory meetings, coordinating them, and securing links with the 
communities. The office itself was a buzz of activity, and CRC employees were among the
most talented and charismatic proponents of participatory budgeting. They appointed
regional (CROP) and thematic (CT) coordinators who would accompany the meetings by
providing technical assistance and general direction to community organisations for the
articulation of demands. Finally, the secretaries of municipal agencies had their own 
assessors who would provide a link between individual agencies and the public (Fedozzi
2000: 68). 
Together, the CRC and the GAPLAN created a new bureaucratic architecture of budgeting
that articulated the embedded public finance envisioned by the Workers’ Party. GAPLAN
would be the technical and rational agency, developing budgets according to formal rules
and subject to secretarial and executive oversight. CRC would be the penetrative agency
that would extend the state into the communities to gather information, justify decisions,
and deliberate priorities with citizen participants (Fedozzi 2001: 103–6). These were not
insignificant appendages to the state; they were major sites of bureaucratic authority and
policy influence, and they were supported by hundreds of partisan activists, dedicated to the
participatory budget process and loyal to the Mayor (Gert and Sintomer 2005).
It should be mentioned that the dramatic changes in administrative processes and structures
were not accepted by all within the municipal administration. There was a sizeable group
who, for partisan or professional reasons, did not support the shift to a participatory process
for deciding investments (Fedozzi 2001: 87). They were backed by a strong corporate identity
rooted in the state-led development plans of preceding decades that had produced vertical
hierarchies of professional cadres within technical and bureaucratic structures. These groups
posed an obstacle to initial changes, and the municipal administration had to overcome
them. To do so, the administration offered retirement plans to some, gained the trust of
others by honoring salary increments offered by the outgoing Mayor, and reorganised the
most important portions of the planning bureaucracy directly under the office of the Mayor.
In addition, by arranging municipal agencies according to the geographic boundaries of the
participatory budgeting regions and decentralising some authority to these regionalised
entities, the administration disarticulated vertical hierarchies of individual agencies. As a
result, bureaucrats came to identify with regional improvements and respond to the
demands of the community rather than the career incentives present in sectoral agencies
(Navarro 1997).
In sum, the municipal administration that came to power in 1989 sought to reorganise the
way in which public finances were managed. The institutions they constructed included 
participatory meetings that operated first in different regions of the city, and later, 
thematic, city-wide meetings. These institutions incorporated mechanisms of accountability
and deliberation for the public to choose investment priorities and oversee government, and
allowed government access to members of the community. These would be the roots of an
embedded public finance that could target differentiated moral and material appeals to 
various sectors of the population. In exchange, the state could secure the contributions each
group could offer. The sections below trace out the way poor and middle sector groups
were increasingly drawn into closer contact with state actors through participatory 
meetings.
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4 Participation: who, where and why
Some of the most striking research on participatory budgeting has focused on patterns of
citizen participation. This paper will attempt neither to cover all of this literature, revise the
conclusions, nor add anything particularly new (Nylen 2002: 135; Giacomoni 1993; Schmidt
1994; Fedozzi 2000; Tavares 1995; Abers 1996; Baiocchi 2000; Goldfrank 2003; Wampler
2004). Participation increased over time, which was a significant achievement in itself.
There is evidence that people participate for different reasons. This provides the first clue
that something unusual was happening; embedded public finance would have to be 
customised for different groups. Participation rapidly increased over time. From 1989 to
2000, participation in the two rounds of budgeting rose from 1,510 to 19,025, with a peak
of over 20,000 in 1999. The pattern of participation is also revealing when disaggregated by
income group. In a survey conducted by the non-governmental organisation CIDADE in
2002, the patterns of lower class participation and representation are evident. In all the
meetings, those with incomes below two minimum salaries made up almost 40 per cent of
the participants, but they were 23 per cent of the regional delegates and 21 per cent of the
municipal councilors. More lower-middle and middle income groups gained representation
in these meetings, though the very poor remain an important group. The figure below
shows the percentage of participants from income groups measured in terms of minimum
salaries per household in which the minimum salary in 2002 was around US$80.
Figure 4.1 Participation by different income groups
Adapted from www.ongcidade.org/site/capa/capa.php, checked 19 June 2005.
Interesting patterns also emerge when one compares different types of meetings. In almost
all the meetings, it was the case that poorer people outnumbered more wealthy ones. On
the other hand, poorer groups dominated thematic meetings much less, as had been
intended by the state actors who designed thematic meetings to attract middle sectors.
The other main observation to be made on participation patterns was the justifications 
people gave for participation. When asked, most people explained their participation
because they appreciated ‘investment in poor areas’, i.e. the material benefit of budgeting.
Yet, the other top six responses were all decidedly non-material: honesty, seriousness, 
innovation, democracy, competence, and transparency. This division between the material
and non-material benefits of budgeting attracted our interest. Though it was not the central
question to be answered here, we were curious to know who was participating for what
reason?
We conducted a survey in the spring of 2003 (Baquero et al. 2005). That survey 
cluster-sampled by neighbourhood to ensure a representative number of middle sector and
poor respondents. The details of the survey will be discussed below. Among the 687
respondents, the survey showed some interesting patterns of who participated for what
reasons. There were two different justifications for participation. One justification was
material and the other non-material. Interestingly, poor respondents were most interested
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1 We performed a logistic regression of participation on survey responses to questions relating to ‘the best thing
about the participatory budget is the democratic process,’ ‘participatory budgeting decreases corruption,’ and 
‘I’ve received material benefits from the participatory budget.’ For middle sectors, the coefficient on ‘corruption’
(0.82) and the coefficient on ‘material benefits’ (0.81) were both statistically significant at p< .05. For the lower
classes, only the coefficient on ‘material benefits’ (1.02) was statistically significant at p< .05. The survey will be 
discussed in greater detail below.
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in the material benefits they hoped to receive, and middle sector respondents, by contrast,
were attracted by both material benefits and the democratic and transparent nature of
governance. In formal terms, middle sector citizens were 2.26 times more likely to 
participate in meetings if they thought participatory budget had decreased corruption, and
they were 2.24 times more likely to participate if they had received material benefits from
participatory budgeting. Poor citizen participation did not change with opinions of
democracy and corruption; rather, the likelihood of participation for poor citizens increased
2.79 times if they thought they received material benefits.1
Figure 4.2 Average percent participation by income (avg minimum salaries 2002)
Adapted from Gomes et al. (2003: 16).
These results are not intended to explain why people participate, nor are they intended to
evaluate representation. This has been the focus of most of the literature on the quality of
participation (Hickey and Mohan 2004). In contrast, we are interested in viewing society
through the ‘eyes’ of the state. What might state elites have seen had they designed appeals
that they thought would resonate when looking at society? We found that poor citizens
and those associated with organised sectors of civil society participate most, though both
lower and middle sectors were involved. It was also clear that the motivations for
participation varied significantly, with poor citizens attracted by the potential to secure
material benefits and middle sectors also seeking non-material benefits. This is consistent
with observations from public opinion surveys in other parts of the world where those
whose immediate needs are met seek ‘post-material’ values in their public action (Inglehart
1990). These results are also suggestive of the kind of embedded public finance the 
government of Porto Alegre would have to build to be successful. Before exploring 
embedded public finance in more detail, we explore its fiscal components in the next 
section. 
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5 The fiscal story – revenues
These patterns of participation differentiated groups on the basis of income. This was
reflected in the types of appeals used to legitimate government and had distinct fiscal
impacts: the government implemented tax policies that draw from those with wealth and
directed investments to the poorer regions of the city. 
The participatory budgeting project began in the context of extremely fragile finances. The
public administration in 1988 was characterised by ‘bloated mayoral office, low salaries, 
dissatisfied employees, decayed equipment, old vehicles, obsolete machinery, investment
capacity around zero; in sum, absolute incapacity of municipal authority to attend to the
minimal needs of maintaining services, investment, and renewal’ (Verle and Muzell 1994: 26).
Within five years, the city had turned itself around, including ‘a rationalisation of expenses
and inherited debts; refinancing of the deficit; administrative restructuring; and recuperating
receipts’ (Cassel and Verle 1994: 29). 
To understand this shift, it is important to know the bases on which Brazilian municipal 
governments survive. Own-sources of funding in municipalities like Porto Alegre include
taxes on several bases (services, income retained at source on salaries, transfer of property,
and property), fees on services like garbage, sewage, and lights; profits on public companies
(which were few); and financial gains (which were significant until the end of inflation in
1994). In the late 1990s, municipalities gained an additional boon to their finances with the
transfer of health service funds (SUS). For many cities, the largest sources are 
constitutionally-mandated transfers from higher levels of government, which were greatly
increased following the 1988 Constitution.
For many municipalities, increased transfers were double-edged. On the one hand, they
provided income and authority; on the other hand local governments had to find 
administrative resources to manage inflows. Where administrative costs or unfunded 
mandates were high, transfers could actually imply a net loss for a municipality, especially
with respect to earmarked transfers like SUS. In terms of the embedded public finance 
discussed here, the increase in transfers was especially problematic. Transfers are a source of
revenue, but they do not depend on deep links to society. In fact, a source of financing
independent of any links to society may cut people off from government, rather than
encourage embedded public finance (Prud’Homme 1998).
In Porto Alegre, however, the period covered by participatory budgeting demonstrated
impressive evidence of a more embedded fiscal contract. Over and above transfer receipts,
the city greatly increased its own-receipts, and the fiscal condition of the government
improved greatly. Total receipts increased 269 per cent from 1988 to 2004, though the
number drops to 216 per cent if one discounts the earmarked health funds. More 
impressive, the increase in tax effort (338 per cent) far outpaced what one might expect
simply as a result of economic growth, which was only 18 per cent in the city (Carvalho dos
Santos 2005).
In particular, a close look at the kinds of taxes the municipality mobilised tells the story of a
city seeking to raise money from particular segments of society. At 27 per cent of total
taxes, the two main municipal taxes are the taxes on services (ISQN) and the tax on 
property (ITPU). In tax reforms between 1989 and 1991, the services tax was raised to levels
equivalent to other major cities, and its yield increased by 172 per cent between 1988 and
2004. More important for the current analysis and for city finances, the main target of
efforts to mobilise resources was the property tax. Returns increased by 416 per cent over
the period, passing from 3 per cent of 1989 tax receipts to 10 per cent in 2004. 
Several means of raising the property tax were employed. The city closed exemptions and
loopholes, revalued properties, published a list of large debtors as an ‘invitation to pay,’
made the rate more progressive, and when progressivity was declared illegal by the
Supreme Court in the late 1990s, recuperated revenue in 2003 with new rates on specially
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classified properties. All of these efforts followed a common underlying principle that ‘those
who had more should pay more’ (Navarro 1998b; Verle 1991). To a Workers’ Party seeking to
appeal to citizens on the basis of income, property tax represented both the most 
productive tax handle available as well as the most just. 
In addition to this resource mobilising potential, the property tax also served as a regulatory
device (Fedozzi 2000: 82). The city could set rates to privilege different categories of
residential, business, and landholding property owners, and give incentives to new patterns
of land use (Goldsmith and Vainer 2001). In particular, the government discouraged large
landholders from storing value in extensive holdings, a common practice under the high
inflation of the early 1990s, but with negative implications for housing shortages and city
centre congestion.
Some of the regulatory functions of the property tax emerged from the artistry of
legislative negotiation. For example, the 2003 reform was dubbed a ‘green’ property tax
that raised rates while giving incentives to environmentally friendly uses of land and 
encouraging a more rational usage of urban spaces. The environmentally friendly label
‘green’ earned moderate support from potentially opposed middle sectors. At different
moments, similar exemptions were extended to retired people, the unemployed, churches,
unions, and those with property of low value. Though these exemptions might have 
perforated the tax net, the city would pass tax increases with exemptions as temporary
measures, and then gradually eliminate the exemptions over time. 
One indication that the citizenry consented to these justifications for tax was an impressive
decrease in tax avoidance. According to the Secretary of Finance, failure to pay property tax
fell from 20 per cent at the start of the 1990s to 13.5 per cent by 1995. ‘The population has
realised that there are no more holidays, and no more advantages to not pay on time’ (Arno
Augustin, quoted in Zero Hora 9 August 1996).2 The mayor attributed improved fiscal
morality to improved monitoring and attaching tax to ability to pay.
These increases in revenue were directly related to participatory budgeting in several ways.
First, the city used participatory meetings to mobilise support for tax reforms. Tarso Genro,
the mayor elected in 1992 and again in 2000 observed, ‘The tax increase will be the 
expression of the political will of the general society’ (Tarso Genro, as quoted in Zero Hora
17 August 2002). This political was built in the 16 regional meetings, the Municipal Budget
Council, and especially the Thematic Meeting on Taxation. Because the government knew
that opposition legislators would oppose proposed tax changes, the city submitted proposals
first to the participatory meetings. ‘The objective of the government was exactly to search
outside the parliament the most support possible as a form of pressuring the deputies’
(Zero Hora 23 March 2000).
As an indication of the improvements in tax effort, the figure below plots own taxes over
time in constant values. The city defied predictions of resource ‘fungibility’ which would 
suggest that local governments decrease their tax effort when they experience an increase
in transfers (Prud’Homme 1995). Porto Alegre also goes beyond the ‘flypaper’ effect which
predicts that cities will let money ‘stick where it hits’ by adding new transfers to old taxes
without changing their own effort (Rosen 1997). Instead, Porto Alegre re-doubled its tax
effort almost at the same time as it received major increases in transfers. 
2 The practice of avoiding property tax through holidays had been an ‘industry’ in Brazil. Property-owners would 
delay payments and allow penalties to accrue until the government offered an amnesty. By then, inflation 
would have eroded the cost of the payments, and those who owed could make a healthy profit.
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Figure 5.1 Tax receipts (2004 R$1,000)
Adapted from Carvalho dos Santos (2005: Annex 9).
This tax increase was not an exogenous boost in revenue that allowed other things, like
increased spending and participation to occur, but rather revenues, representation, and
expenditures were closely related. The Mayor from 1997–2000 sensed this relationship
when he explained that people were willing to contribute more taxes because they 
understood that ‘taxes return to them in the form of public services’ (Raul Pont, quoted in
Zero Hora 13 December 1999). The following section examines exactly how those public
services were made more effective and progressive.
6 The fiscal story – expenditures
The expenditure side of the fiscal ledger involves changes to public services that included an
increase in quantity, more transparent delivery, and a greater effort to target poor
communities. Participatory budget institutions were associated with this shift in two ways.
First, participatory budgeting included a decision-making process in which poor citizens had
privileged access as a result of their higher levels of participation. Second, the formula used
to distribute funds and to make other institutional decisions, such as the boundaries of
different regions, gave preference to the poorest neighbourhoods that had the weakest
infrastructure. 
The main areas of interest here were investments and personnel, and the main allocative
decisions were across sectors and neighbourhoods. The shifts produced by participatory
budgeting were long overdue; in the 1970s and 1980s, public services had not adjusted to
economic and social changes occurring in the city, including a decline in industrial 
production and employment, an increase in the service sector, and population growth as a
result of in-migration, especially from the interior of the state. The municipal administration,
however, had responded only by expanding personnel haphazardly, failing to rationalise
administrative functions and increasing both the number and costs of personnel far more
rapidly than was sustainable. While the population grew by 25 per cent, the number of
public servants grew by 86 per cent, and the number of retired employees collecting 
pensions grew by 174 per cent. The burden for the public administration was exacerbated by
the populist strategy of the outgoing Mayor in 1988, who gave the entire public sector a
237 per cent salary raise in the final month of his mandate (Fedozzi 2000: 81–2). This may
have contributed to his victory in the governor race of 1990, but it saddled the city 
administration with an unsustainable wage bill. 
In subsequent years, personnel expenses were brought under control. They fell from 100 per
cent of current receipts in 1989 to 68 per cent in 1993 and were below 50 per cent from
1997 to 2001 (or an average of 65 per cent excluding the SUS transfers). They began to
creep upwards after 2001, in part because receipts were not expanding as rapidly as before,
but at no point did personnel expenses exceed federal ceilings that were eventually 
established in the 2000 Fiscal Responsibility Law.
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In the 1980s, spiraling recurrent costs (especially personnel and interest payments) squeezed
investment capacity, but from 1991 to 1995 the city greatly increased investments, which
peaked at R$172 million in 1994. For most of the 1990s, when loans were scarce and 
interest rates high, investment was sustained with own-receipts. After 1999, capital inflows
in the form of loans began to return, and investments moved upwards after a lull during the
second half of the 1990s. As a percentage of current receipts, investments peaked at 23 per
cent in 1994, and they hovered around 8 to 10 per cent for most of the latter half of the
decade.
Figure 6.1 Investment as percentage of receipts
From: Cavalho (2005).
Much of this investment was directed towards social sectors especially education. In 
particular, Brazilian municipal and state governments are expected to provide primary 
education, which is widely considered to be especially important to the poor. In 2004,
Porto Alegre spent above the mandatory federal minimum on primary education and spent
far more than the amount financed by the national government. The federal government,
through the FUNDEF program, offered cities R$2945 per month per student. The city
spent R$1199 per student, 3.6 times what was expected, and when one considers the high
rate of well-to-do students sent to private schools (19 per cent of students in Porto Alegre
are sent to private elementary schools), this represents a relatively targeted effort to direct
funds towards education for the poorest citizens. 
Another pattern of investment emerges when one examines the demands expressed in 
participatory budgeting. From 1993 to 1999, the top three priorities were sanitation, 
housing, and paving. The order switched from year to year, but that normally remained the
top three. In 1992, 2002, and 2003, education was among the top three, and in 2000,
health entered (Gomes et al. 2003: 35). This prioritisation led to some impressive 
achievements. More than 96,000 houses were connected to potable water sources, and the
proportion of households with access rose from 83 per cent to 99 per cent. Over 130,000
houses were connected to the municipal sewerage system, raising the percentage with
access from 46 per cent to 82 per cent (PMPA 2000). Other services also improved. The
number of paved roads increased by 182 per cent, with the rate of new paving increasing
from 4 to 20 kilometres per year. The garbage service doubled, and street lighting increased
by 290 per cent. 
A close look at the distribution of investments suggests that the city was also giving 
preferential access to the poor. To some degree, this can be attributed to the formula for
investments which included a weighting associated with levels of poverty and need for
infrastructure. As a result, poorer neighbourhoods received greater investment in their
chosen priorities. In addition, the over-representation of the poor among participants gave
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them additional power within participatory budget deliberations.3 It is difficult to get an
accurate measure of the incidence of spending without extensive household surveys, but an
impression is possible by disaggregating the city by neighbourhood. Census data from 1991
shows average income (in minimum salaries) of heads of households. There are obvious 
differences across the city, with the average income in Centro (Centre) more than five times
the average income of household heads in the Nordeste (Northeast). There are also 
differences in the value of investments as a percentage of the total, with Centro Sul (Centre
South) receiving more than twice the amount of investments as Sul (South). These 
differences were evident in per capita provisions Restinga received 35 kilometres of paving
for each 1,000 people, Lomba do Pinheiro received 41, while Eixo received only 9.
We can use the data collected and analyzed by Adalmir Marquetti (2003: 139, 141) to 
examine the relationship between investment and average income of household heads.
Following Marquetti, the best fit appears to be a quadratic regression of investment value
on income of household heads. Investment value along the vertical axis is displayed in terms
of average annual investment value from 1992 until 2000, and it stays relatively flat in very
poor and poor neighbourhoods before tapering rapidly once the average income increases
in the wealthier neighbourhoods.
Figure 6.2 Neighbourhood investment
Source: Marquetti (2003: 139, 141).
To summarise, Porto Alegre underwent rapid change beginning in 1989. The city 
government introduced an innovative participatory decision-making model, increased its
revenues by drawing more from wealthy citizens, expanded fiscal capacity, and directed that
capacity towards investments in poor neighbourhoods. These accomplishments are 
important and impressive, and they have rightfully attracted international attention to the
city. They also bring us back to our original puzzle. How did the city mobilise revenues from
3 It should be noted that the population weighting that was also in the formula had an ambiguous impact, as 
some of the most densely populated areas were actually not the poorest (Marquetti 2003).
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those with wealth to distribute to those without? More specifically, were middle sectors
really willing to contribute? What did the poor offer in exchange for their increased 
benefits? How were these relationships between state and society institutionalised and
articulated within participatory budgeting? To answer these questions, we returned to some
of the curious patterns emerging in the evidence on participation, in which middle sectors
participated more in the thematic meetings; lower sectors participated more in the regions;
some people sought material benefits; and others sought non-material quality of life issues.
These patterns suggest an avenue to understand embedded public finance.
7 Embedded public finance in 
Porto Alegre
This section examines the evidence from our public opinion survey on links between state
and society. Middle sectors were asked to contribute tax revenues in exchange for cleaner
and more democratic government. Poor citizens were asked to contribute political support
in exchange for material benefits. These were not particularistic exchanges of a clientelistic
sort; rather, they represented a customised and targeted version of citizenship in which 
government drew on the assets citizens had available and responded effectively and
accountably to their demands.
Other researchers have also been intrigued by the difference between material and non-
material demands. Schmidt compared the demands of different neighbourhoods and
observed that poorer areas demanded street paving and basic sanitation while wealthier
neighbourhoods demanded more parks and street-cleaning (1994: 138–54, as cited in
Fedozzi 2001). These quality of life issues make sense for middle sectors. They are the 
professional classes, the small business-owners, and the public sector workers whose 
experience of government is frequent and direct. They depend on government not for basic
needs but for the regulatory frameworks associated with property rights, business practice,
and lifestyle. For government to reach these sectors, it would have to adopt principles of
‘good governance’ in the traditional, liberal sense. Middle sectors want states that operate
effectively, efficiently, and democratically; in short, they want to address long-standing 
problems of clientelism, corruption, and authoritarianism in Brazilian public administration
(Weyland 1996; Nunes 1997). 
The administration knew these were the demands of middle sectors, and sought to respond
(Navarro 1996: 30). In 1992 the Mayor commented, ‘The middle sectors, in many regions, did
not attend the meetings ... It is now the moment to reinforce the presence of the middle
classes; allowing citizens to control, oversee, and criticise the state and the government’
(Zero Hora 22 December 1992). Other Workers’ Party politicians linked middle sector
demands for good government directly to tax contributions. Iria Charão, the official who
managed the participatory budget at the state level from 1999 to 2002 explained, ‘Citizens,
who always paid the bill without knowing where the money from taxes was going, now
know. Despite all the fights over tax, the voters approved the proposal to raise taxes
because they had decided where the money was to be spent’ (Zero Hora 19 November
2000). 
This is not to say that middle sectors did not appreciate increases in investment and public
activity. Some among their ranks were direct beneficiaries, even if the investments targeted
poor neighbourhoods where they did not live. Among middle sectors, remember, were
public employees who continued to receive decent salaries, and most important, were paid
on time. Construction firms obtained contracts for the infrastructure investments 
undertaken, and they too were paid on time (Abers 2000). Finally, middle sectors valued
the international fame associated with being the home of participatory budgeting. To be
sure, there were those among their ranks that bridled at the increases in taxes, the 
progressive rhetoric, and the leftist history of the Workers’ Party; yet for 16 years, the
4 These proportions intentionally oversampled middle sectors to get a reasonable number of respondents from 
each group. Other self-reported measures of class were highly correlated with these, and the regression 
results were robust to different measures of class. 
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Workers’ Party governed in Porto Alegre with impressive middle sector support. 
Lower class groups also valued democracy, efficiency, and transparency, but these needs
were dominated by more material ones. Some observers criticise material demands as
immediate, narrow and single-issue. In particular, critics feared that popular movements
with narrow demands were doomed to disappear once demands were met (Kowarick and
Singer 1993). Yet, for much of the population, material needs were very real and were of
the first order. It was not that they were uninterested in democracy and transparency;
rather, they simply had other demands that came first. ‘In reality, the community 
movements were more worried in securing goods and urban services than the discussion of
the institutional engineering to democratise the state’ (Fedozzi 2001: 97). 
In exchange for material benefits, the Workers’ Party asked for political support from lower
sectors. One form of support was participation in the budgeting meetings. Poor people
began to participate massively once funds available for allocation increased after 1990. High
levels of participation lent legitimacy to the government, and when this legitimacy was
insufficient to win legislative battles, the mayor called on citizens to fill the gallery of the
Assembly, pressure the opposition, and support executive plans, all of which participatory
budgeting participants dutifully provided. The most important form of political support, of
course, was electoral, and lower sector citizens, with their massive numbers, were a crucial
base of electoral support for the Workers’ Party. The party finally lost power in 2004, but
this was after four consecutive mayoral victories in a city and a state known for electoral
volatility and see-sawing voting patterns. 
These observations lend support to the notion that participatory budgeting embedded 
public finance with customised benefits to meet differentiated group demands. For
additional evidence that citizens perceived these links to the state, we turn to our opinion
survey. Intentionally, we had clustered our sample to obtain a relatively even split of middle
sector and lower sector respondents. Among our sample of 687 respondents, 320 
identified themselves as middle or lower middle class and 260 identified themselves as
working, poor, or lower class.4
First, we wanted to explore citizen perceptions of participatory budgeting. Respondents
were asked whether they trusted a series of different institutions, among them 
participatory budgeting, and participatory budgeting ranked higher in confidence than all
other possibilities, including government, parties, and fellow citizens. 233 respondents
reported high levels of trust in participatory budgeting, 232 moderate levels, and 103 low
levels. These were relatively evenly split between and among middle and lower class 
respondents, with slightly more lower class respondents reporting high confidence and
slightly more middle sectors reporting moderate confidence.
Figure 7.1 Trust participatory budget by group (no. respondents)
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We also wanted to explore the benefits people perceived. If groups perceived benefits, they
would be more willing to pay tax and offer political support. More interesting, embedded
public finance required different groups to connect participatory budgeting to different
forms of support. Lower sectors would have to perceive material benefits if they were to
offer political support; and middle sectors would have to perceive non-material benefits if
they were offer tax contributions. 
Figure 7.2 displays the steps in the causal process that we were interested in 
exploring. Citizens that trusted participatory budgeting would have to perceive certain 
benefits (non-material benefits for the middle sectors, material benefits for lower sectors),
and these benefits would have to produce different contributions (tax compliance for middle
sectors, political support for lower sectors).
Figure 7.2 Causal process
To confirm that perceived benefits operated as a causal mechanism to link participatory
budgeting to tax and political support, we tested the link between different material and
non-material benefits and participatory budgeting. Among both middle and lower sectors,
and for several different measures of benefits, there was a clear positive relationship
between participatory budgeting and perceived benefits. Appendix 1 presents the statistical
correlations and a discussion of these results. 
Our model operates on the intuition that citizens that perceive benefits were positively 
disposed to make contributions to the state, and different citizens are expected to make 
different contributions. In particular, middle sector groups had to be induced to offer taxes
and poor groups had to be induced to offer their political support. To get at these 
contributions, we asked people a series of questions about tax and voting. The results for
tax were not surprising; most people do not view taxes favorably. This result is even more
expected in Brazil where tax levels increased by over 10 per cent of GDP in 10 years. Of 573
valid responses, 326 were not satisfied with what they paid in tax. Only 173 people were a
little satisfied with their tax burden and only 70 were very satisfied. 
Within both the poor and middle sectors, confidence in participatory budgeting was 
associated with satisfaction with tax contributions. For lower class respondents, this was not
all that surprising; they were not the ones who paid most taxes, though Brazil’s regressive
tax system meant they paid more than one might expect. It was more important to secure
the compliance of middle sector citizens; they were the ones with resources that could be
mobilised. Both the lower classes and the middle sectors were more satisfied with their tax
contributions if they trusted participatory budgeting. Each increase in participatory 
budgeting trust was associated with a 0.27 increase in tax satisfaction for lower classes, a
0.15 increase for middle sectors, and a 0.20 increase overall. These coefficients appear in the
first column of Table 7.1; satisfaction with tax ranged from zero to two. 
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5 To make the coefficients comparable, we re-ran the original equation with only the cases that had 
observations on all the variables in the full model.
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We wanted to use our model of causal mechanisms to discern what kind of benefit people
had to be offered to convince them to pay tax. We ran regressions for tax satisfaction with
both an independent variable (trust in participatory budgeting) and causal mechanisms 
(non-material and material benefits). If both independent and intermediate variables
remained significant, it would provide a weak confirmation of the causal path leading from
trust in participatory budgeting to benefit and on to support for tax. The tests are reported
in the table below with standard errors in parentheses. The model without intermediate
variables is included in the first column, and the comparison of coefficients across the
columns separates the impact of trust in participatory budgeting from any independent
impact of the causal process indicators.5 The percentage decline in the coefficient is the
amount of the explanatory ‘power’ that has to be shared with the intermediate variable.
Table 7.1 Were people satisfied with tax, and why?
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01
Consistent with the earlier results, trust in the participatory budget was positively associated
with evaluations of tax. Those who trust participatory budgeting were 0.16 more satisfied
with their tax contributions (middle sectors 0.13 and the poor 0.18 more satisfied). In terms
of the causal process indicators, the non-material benefits of participatory budgeting were
more important for middle sectors while lower classes were more interested in the material
benefits of participatory budgeting. An increase in non-material benefits led to a 0.35
increase in middle sector satisfaction and an increase in material benefits led to a 0.18
increase in lower class satisfaction. Interestingly, material benefits were not significant for
Simple model Full model Full model
Tax Tax
Middle Trust PB .15***
(.057)
.13*
(.070)
5.28
Material benefits .028
(.070)
Non-material benefits .35**
(.15)
N 263 210
Lower classes Trust PB .26***
(.071)
.18**
(.087)
8.68
Material benefits .18**
(.089)
Non-material benefits .023
(.18)
N 205 161
Overall Trust PB .20***
(.042)
.16***
(.051)
2.22
Material benefits .082
(.052)
Non-material benefits .19*(.082)
N 513 406
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middle sectors and non-material benefits were not significant for the poor. These results
appear in the second column of Table 7.1.
Adding the causal mechanism variable led to a slight decrease in the coefficient on trust in
participatory budgeting. Overall, the coefficient fell by 2.2 per cent, while the dip was 5.3
per cent for middle sectors and 8.7 per cent for the lower classes. These results appear in
the last column of Table 7.1. They indicate that a small amount of the correlation between
trust in participatory budgeting and tax satisfaction in the first model was perhaps coming
from excluded intermediate variables.
These results suggest that lower class citizens and middle sectors linked positive feelings
about participatory budgeting to satisfaction with tax. Lower class citizens that felt 
confident in participatory budgeting perceived increased social investment and for this 
reason were satisfied with their tax contributions. By contrast, middle sectors that felt 
confident in participatory budgeting were more likely to perceive increased efficiency in the
public sector and for this reason were satisfied with their tax contributions. Viewed through
the eyes of the state, more tax revenue could be mobilised from middle sectors because
they perceived non-material benefits from participatory budgeting. From the poor, more
revenues were available because they perceived material benefits.
We ran a similar test for an indicator of political support, identification with the Workers’
Party. Unlike the example of tax, in which the most important constituency was the middle
sector that possessed resources, the most important constituency for partisan identification
was the lower sectors. They were the most numerous in the city, and their political support
sustained state legitimacy and partisan power. Previous research has shown that partisan
identifiers are the most likely to vote for a party, engage in activism, do the street-level
work of contacting and mobilising voters, and are one of the keys to electoral success
(Campbell, Converse, Stokes and Miller 1960; von Mettenheim 1990). 
Once again, we began with a simple model that just related participatory budget trust to
Workers’ Party identification. There was a strong positive association that held for both
lower class and middle sector groups. Overall, the likelihood that a respondent would 
identify with the Workers’ Party increased 2.2 times for each increase in trust in 
participatory budgeting. Among middle sectors, the ratio was 2.1 times and among lower
classes the ratio was 2.3 times.
To check for different causal paths across groups, we next included the material and 
non-material benefits in the model. The coefficient on trust in participatory budgeting
remained significant, with respondents that trusted participatory budgeting 1.8 times as 
likely to identify with the Workers’ Party, and a ratio of 1.7 among middle sectors and 1.8
among lower sectors. 
Once again, the non-material benefits of participatory budgeting were more important for
middle sectors, and the material benefits were more important for lower sectors. If they
perceived non-material benefits (drop in corruption), the likelihood that middle sectors
identified with the Workers’ Party increased 2.8 times, while lower classes increased their
likelihood of partisan identification by only 1.9 times. Instead, material benefits (increased
investment in poor neighbourhoods) provided the more important causal process for lower
classes. Their partisan identification increased 2 times for each perceived increase in material
benefits while middle sector partisan identification increased only 1.9 times and overall the
ratio was 1.6.6
For the whole sample and the middle sectors, the changes in the coefficients across models
were relatively small, 4 per cent and 5.5 per cent respectively. For lower classes the change
6 Again, we re-ran the simple model with only the cases with scores on all the variables.
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was much higher, 24 per cent, suggesting that a large portion of the explanatory power of
trust in participatory budgeting was coming from the intermediate variable of perceived
material benefits. 
Table 7.2 Were people willing to lend political support, and why?
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01
It has long been evident that participatory budgeting coincided with increased tax capacity
and support for the government. What was not clear was how general good-feeling about
participatory budgeting translated into these valuable resources the state could draw from
citizens. This section has used data from a public opinion survey to trace the process by
which confidence in participatory budgeting is translated into tax capacity and political 
support. In particular, it shows that the linkages between state and society articulated by
participatory budgeting differ across social groups. For middle sector groups interested in
non-material benefits, participatory budgeting is perceived in terms of democratic values
and transparent government. For lower classes, participatory budgeting is perceived in
terms of greater investment in poor areas and increased social assistance. These causal
processes offer what social groups want from the state, and in return, the state draws 
contributions. From middle sectors, the main contribution is tax; from lower classes, the
main contribution is political support. 
Simple model Full model % Change
Partisan ID Partisan ID
Overall Trust in participa-
tory budgeting
.77***
(.14)
.59***(.18) 3.96
Material benefits .49*
(.26)
Non-material
benefits
.75***
(.23)
N 563 418
Middle sectors Trust in participa-
tory budgeting
.77***
(.20)
.53**
(.25)
5.53
Material benefits .65*
(.38)
Non-material
benefits
.90***
(.32)
N 281 218 24
Lower classes Trust in participa-
tory budgeting
.84***
(.25)
.54*
(.31)
Material benefits .70
(.44)
Non-material
benefits
.64*
(.38)
N 231 162
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8 Conclusions
When the Workers’ Party was elected in 1988, it implemented an innovative set of
budgeting institutions that incorporated direct participation from citizens. This required a
reorganisation of the budget process and an adjustment of the public bureaucracy to initiate
a new pattern of public decision-making. The participatory process attracted wide public
involvement, and it was particularly effective in mobilising the participation of lower class
citizens.
Over the ensuing 16 years, participatory budgeting has coincided with a rapid increase in tax
burdens, particularly for middle sectors. In addition, there was a steady improvement of
public services and allocations to social sectors, especially those targeted towards poor parts
of the city. These fiscal and institutional changes are brought together in a system of
embedded public finance in which state actors targeted social groups with the benefits each
group wanted, and in exchange, government secured the assets each group could offer. In
the case of the middle sectors, the exchange was good government for tax contributions. In
the case of the lower classes, the exchange was material benefits for political support. 
This innovation is of particular importance to the Leftist parties currently coming to power
in Latin America. In Brazil, Chile, Venezuela, Uruguay, and Argentina, governments led by
Leftist leaders have been elected in recent years; upcoming elections in Nicaragua and
Mexico could potentially deliver two more; Left parties are important in El Salvador and
Guatemala; and popular movements have brought down governments in Ecuador and
Bolivia. Though these movements vary from indigenous to populist to socialist to social
democratic, they share one commonality: all would like to address severe inequalities within
their countries by mobilising resources (Shifter and Jawahar 2005). It used to be that the
threat of Leftist redistribution scared middle sectors which preferred Rightist options that,
arguably, promised competence. The Porto Alegre example demonstrates that it might be
possible to combine good government with just government, and maintain a cross-class
coalition while doing it.
Appendix 1 Testing the causal
mechanism
Our model posits benefits perceived as the intermediate step that links independent 
variables (trust in participatory budgeting) to dependent variables (tax payments and political
support). In this role, benefits are the causal mechanism, ‘the real-world phenomenon of
causation’ (Brady and Collier 2004: 277). 
To test perceived benefits as intermediate variables, we made use of several survey 
questions on non-material (efficiency, corruption) and material (investment in social sectors) 
benefits, and we separated our sample in middle sector and lower class populations. Among
lower sectors, in a logistic regression, the likelihood they believed government was efficient
increased by 2.14 times for each increase in participatory budget trust. For middle sectors
that ratio was 1.74 times, and overall the ratio was 2.09. A similar pattern was evident for
the decrease in corruption, for which each increase in lower class respondent trust
increased the likelihood 2.68 times, increases in middle sector trust increased the likelihood
2.58 times and overall the ratio was 2.60. Trust was measured low, moderate and high, and
the perceived non-material benefits were measured either ‘not at all’ or ‘improved.’
Respondents that trusted participatory budgeting were also more likely to perceive material
benefits. Among all respondents, each increase in trust in participatory budgeting was 
associated with a 0.29 increase in perceived investment in social assistance (0.30 middle 
sector and 0.28 lower class). A similar pattern was evident for perceived investment in poor
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neighbourhoods. Overall, each increase in trust was associated with an increase in the 
likelihood that respondents perceived increased investment by 2.30 times (2.47 among
lower classes and 3.02 among middle sectors). Social assistance was measured on a 
continuous scale and investment was measured on a binary ‘not at all-improved’ scale. 
These coefficients, reported in the table below with standard errors in parentheses, confirm
that citizen perceived both material and non-material benefits from participatory budgeting.
The coefficients in the logistic regression equations are reported in the text as logistic
odds-ratios and as logit coefficients in the table for comparison across columns.
Table 8.1 Perceived benefits of participatory budgeting
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01
Non-material benefits Material benefits
Public sector
efficiency
Decrease in 
corruption
Social assistance
investment
Investment in
poor neighbour-
hoods
Overall Trust PB .77***
(.14)
.95***(.14) .29***(.044) .83***(.15)
N 563 475 462 461
Middle 
sectors
Trust PB .93***
(.20)
.93***
(.20)
.28***
(.063)
1.10***
(.23)
N 281 245 234 231
Lower classes Trust PB .84***
(.25)
.98***
(.24)
.30***
(.068)
.91***(.23)
N 231 185 188 188
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